In September of 1993, the Palestine Liberation of Organization (PLO) and the state of Israel exchanged letters of mutual recognition and then signed the Oslo I Accord, accompanied by the famous handshake between Yitzḥak Rabin and Yasir Arafat on the White House lawn. Despite the optimism of the moment, the peace process of the 1990s only ushered in an increase in terrorism and demonization of the Jewish state. Efraim Karsh provides a thorough investigation of what he calls “the worst calamity to have afflicted Israelis and Palestinians since the 1948 war.”

For the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, [Oslo] has brought about subjugation to corrupt and repressive PLO and Hamas regimes—regimes that have reversed the hesitant advent of civil society in these territories, shattered their socioeconomic well-being, and perpetuated the conflict with Israel while keeping their hapless constituents in constant [fear] as their leaders lined their pockets from the proceeds of this misery.

For Israel, it has been the starkest strategic blunder in the country’s history—establishing ineradicable terror entities on its doorstep, denting its military and strategic posture, deepening its internal cleavages, destabilizing its political system, and weakening its international standing.

The Oslo process had, however, one major achievement that has gone virtually unnoticed. . . . In one fell swoop, Israel effectively ended its 30-year-long control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’s populace. Since January 1996, and certainly after the completion of the Hebron redeployment, 99 percent of the Palestinians in these territories have not lived under Israeli “occupation” but under PLO/Palestian Authority rule (in Gaza, since 2007, under Hamas’s rule).

Yet, writes Karsh, the negative consequence of the peace process were fully evident even before the outbreak of the second intifada in 2000:

In the two-and-a-half years between the signing of [Oslo I] and the fall of the Labor government in May 1996, 210 Israelis were murdered—nearly three times the average annual death toll of the previous 26 years.

A central assumption underlying . . . the entire Oslo process, was that Israel’s concessions would boost its international standing and strengthen its ability to fight the formidable security threats confronting it. What this line of thinking failed to consider is that since Israel, as the world’s only Jewish state, attracts the full brunt of anti-Jewish bigotry and hatred that has hitherto been reserved for individuals and communities, the Palestinians have become “untouchable” in their role as the latest rod to beat the Jews.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.