Seeing the war in Gaza as part of a “civil war” within the Islamic world, Aryeh Tepper stresses Hamas’s origins in the Muslim Brotherhood, whose ideology rests on claims that render most Arab states illegitimate. Hamas today aligns itself with the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose Shiite founders drew deeply on the writings of the Brotherhood’s Sunni theorists. On the other side are what Tepper calls the “anti-Islamist league” of Morocco, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt, whose foreign ministers gathered in Israel for a summit last year. This group now finds itself on the defensive:

For the foreseeable future, the tolerant camp faces its own internal fissures and challenges. In Morocco, the left and the Islamists are marching for Gaza and publicly embarrassing the monarchy. In the UAE, ties to Israel were conditioned from the beginning on the appearance of a Palestinian diplomatic horizon, while Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, the ruler of the emirate of Sharjah, [one of the country’s seven confederates], is known to have Islamist sympathies. Bahrain’s Prince Salman publicly condemned Hamas’s barbarism on two occasions, but memories remain from the 2011 Islamist winter, [i.e., the aftermath of the Arab Spring], when demonstrators from the country’s Shiite majority demanded the downfall of the monarchy. As for Egypt, refugees are massing at Gaza’s Rafah border crossing, and Cairo has been clear that their flight into Northern Sinai will lead to a disruption of relations with Israel.

One thing can be said with confidence in this dynamic geopolitical mix: the Islamists must not be allowed to appear victorious. A Hamas victory, which in the present case means holding on to control of Gaza no matter the material and human price, . . . will inspire Islamists (and post-colonialists) around the world and attract new recruits to the cause. Israel’s victory, however, will demonstrate that resistance is futile. For the sake of its own survival, and for the sake of a humane, pluralist future in the Middle East and North Africa, Israel must annihilate Hamas.

Before exploding electronics in Lebanon seized the attention of the Israeli public, debate there had focused on the Philadelphi Corridor—the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—and whether the IDF can afford to withdraw from it. Egypt has opposed Israeli control of the corridor, which is crucial to Hamas’s supply lines, and Egyptian objections likely prevented Israel from seizing it earlier in the war. Yet, argues Mariam Wahba, Egypt in the long run only stands to lose by letting Hamas use the corridor, and has proved incapable of effectively sealing it off:

Ultimately, this moment presents an opportunity for the United States to hold Egypt’s feet to the fire.

To press Cairo, the United States should consider conditioning future aid on Cairo’s willingness to cooperate. This should include a demand for greater transparency and independent oversight to verify Egyptian claims about the tunnels. Congress ought to hold hearings to understand better Egypt’s role and its compliance as a U.S. ally. Despite Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s nine trips to the Middle East since the start of the war, there has been little clarity on how Egypt intends to fulfill its role as a mediator.

By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests, prolonging the war in Gaza, and further destabilizing its relationship with Jerusalem. It is time for Egyptian leaders either to admit their inability to secure the border and seek help from Israel and America, or to risk being perceived as enablers of Hamas and its terrorist campaign.