On Saturday, an attack drone launched by Iran-backed Houthi guerrillas in Yemen struck a commercial tanker in the Red Sea, and another drone—thought to have been launched from Iran itself—hit a chemical tanker off the Indian coast. Both ships’ crews, none of whom were injured, were made up mostly of Indian citizens. India has since dispatched several naval vessels to protect its sea lanes. Meanwhile, there was an explosion near the Israeli embassy in New Delhi on Tuesday. These events suggest that, despite its history of cordial relations with Iran, the world’s largest democracy has reason to see Tehran’s regional aggression as a threat to its own security. And this is happening at a time when Israel and India have been growing closer.

Yeshaya Rosenman observes that Indian popular opinion is moving in the same direction:

Never before October 8 had Israel been flooded with so many Indian reporters. Of the few thousand foreign journalists who rushed to Israel to cover the war, over a hundred arrived from India, including many of the most famous faces of Indian media. . . . Even more unusual than the sheer magnitude of Indian-focused coverage is the fact that Indian media were staunchly supportive of Israel.

Indian Muslims number an estimated 200 million, roughly 15 percent of the 1.4 billion Indians. The majority are not radical. . . . However, the October 28 televised speech of the Hamas leader, Khaled Mashal, to a Jamaat-e-Islami (India’s Muslim Brotherhood) rally was an alarming development. The rally was part of a campaign titled “Uproot Hindutva and Apartheid Zionism.” Hindutva, the ideology of Hindu nationalists—here just a code word for Hindus—was equated with Zionism by Muslim Brotherhood leaders in a candid attempt to export Hamas ideology and methods to India.

In 2003, the Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi, spooked by the American display of might in Iraq, decided to destroy or surrender his entire nuclear program. Informed observers have suggested that the deal he made with the U.S. should serve as a model for any agreement with Iran. Robert Joseph provides some useful background:

Gaddafi had convinced himself that Libya would be next on the U.S. target list after Iraq. There was no reason or need to threaten Libya with bombing as Gaddafi was quick to tell almost every visitor that he did not want to be Saddam Hussein. The images of Saddam being pulled from his spider hole . . . played on his mind.

President Bush’s goal was to have Libya serve as an alternative model to Iraq. Instead of war, proliferators would give up their nuclear programs in exchange for relief from economic and political sanctions.

Any outcome that permits Iran to enrich uranium at any level will fail the one standard that President Trump has established: Iran will not be allowed to have a nuclear weapon. Limiting enrichment even to low levels will allow Iran to break out of the agreement at any time, no matter what the agreement says.

Iran is not a normal government that observes the rules of international behavior or fair “dealmaking.” This is a regime that relies on regional terror and brutal repression of its citizens to stay in power. It has a long history of using negotiations to expand its nuclear program. Its negotiating tactics are clear: extend the negotiations as long as possible and meet any concession with more demands.