Earlier this month, a mainstream Jewish organization announced that it was planning a “gathering” outside the Qatari embassy in Washington, demanding it pressure Hamas to release hostages. The demonstration was subsequently cancelled due to inclement weather, but it has not been rescheduled and the webpage with details about the gathering has been taken down. One can only hope that the organizers were not dissuaded by the Gulf emirate’s massive influence operation in the West (including over $1 million in donations to New York City public schools), which it has already used to discourage the families of hostages from taking such measures. Given the fact that Qatar funds and hosts Hamas, provides it with diplomatic cover, and propagandizes on its behalf, it certainly has leverage over the organization. It is also likely to be embarrassed by public demonstrations.

Meanwhile, Doha has continued to portray itself as a helpful interlocutor, reportedly proposing another ceasefire deal this week, which appears to have fallen through already. Matthew Karnitschnig raises an even more troubling possibility:

In a series of conversations with Politico in recent weeks, Western intelligence officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the issue, said that while they have no hard evidence, there are indications the emirate may have known more about the October 7 attack than it has let on.

The primary motivation Qatar would have had to remain silent if it caught wind of the attack, the intelligence officials said, was its interest in derailing talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia, a regional rival, over normalizing relations.

An agreement between the two largest economies in the region could have opened the door to strategic cooperation across a host of areas, including natural gas, Qatar’s lifeblood. Given Israel’s direct access to the Mediterranean and European markets, any energy collaboration with Saudi Arabia would be a game changer.

I’m always cautious about putting too much stock in anonymous reports from unnamed intelligence officials. Yet even if the worst allegations aren’t true, Qatar’s support for Hamas is a fact. And this should make the U.S. reconsider the results of what Karnitschnig calls Doha’s “decades-long effort to make itself an indispensable partner to all sides of the Middle East equation.”

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.