Yesterday evening, the ongoing talks in Cairo to arrange a Palestinian-prisoners-for-Israeli-hostages deal appear to have broken down decisively. Yigal Carmon argues that to free Israelis from Hamas captivity, the U.S. should be using its leverage against Qatar, which is serving as an intermediary in negotiations, instead of pressuring Jerusalem to make concessions:

Qatar isn’t pressuring Hamas despite the fact that in reality, Qatar is the lifeline of Hamas—its hope, its future, its power to continue to fight and to hold the hostages. Qatar built Hamas from a small organization into a military and political power. It took pride in its training of “Hamas security officials.” . . . Without Qatar, Hamas is doomed. And why should Qatar pressure Hamas? The Biden administration is happy with it anyway.

President Biden needs a political victory for his reelection: one such victory would be to finish the war with a peace process that begins with a new hostage-release deal and allows for Biden’s plan to take off with the participation of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority.

Worse still, writes Carmon, the White House believes Qatar can help facilitate a postwar grand bargain involving Saudi-Israeli normalization and a path the Palestinian statehood:

The administration believes that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt will join in a process in which Qatar is the leader. This will never happen. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are Qatar’s sworn adversaries. . . . Qatar is the ticking bomb that will blow up any peace process, because it stands for Hamas. In fact, it is part of . . . the anti-U.S. bloc comprising Hamas, Hizballah, the Houthis, Iran, Russia, and China (even on the issue of Taiwan, Qatar sides with China).

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.