In a joint press conference yesterday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and his British counterpart David Cameron commented on the possibility of an Israeli offensive into the city of Rafah, which lies on the Gaza-Egypt border. Cameron notably seemed to say that, in the event that hostage negotiations fail, an attack on Rafah is inevitable. Both an IDF incursion on Hamas’s last stronghold, and the hostage negotiations themselves, rely heavily on the cooperation of Egypt, which both serves as an important intermediary and controls one of the roads leading in and out of Rafah.

Haisam Hassanein and Ofir Winter discuss Egypt’s involvement thus far, and how the war has affected its relations with Israel:

The war . . . has exposed the rifts within various circles in the Egyptian government, between those few who see Israel as a useful neighbor and those in the mainstream, who continue to espouse populist and hostile positions that have a Nasserist and even Islamist nature. . . . The discourse of the Egyptian state-run media does not ameliorate the situation. Military commentators tend to refer to Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement.

Al-Azhar University, the leading religious institution in the Sunni world, has adopted an anti-Israel rhetoric reminiscent of that of the Muslim Brotherhood. On the day of the massacre, even before the IDF had launched its response, al-Azhar praised Hamas’s terrorist operation and has been conducting a systematic smear campaign against Israel ever since.

Furthermore, few Egyptian media personalities or intellectuals have dared to condemn Hamas’s brutal attack harshly and unequivocally on October 7. In fact, the official Egyptian media has not even reported on most of the atrocities that Hamas perpetrated.

But, as often has been the case in the 45 years since the two countries made peace, public vituperation is matched with behind-the-scenes cooperation:

Notwithstanding the evident tensions between the two countries since October 7, the intimate military coordination that has developed over the past decade—primarily focused on border security and the war on terror—has served its purpose well even during the current crisis. . . . It seems that as Israel advances in its campaign against Hamas and reassures Egypt’s concerns about the transfer of Gazan refugees to Egyptian territory, these steps will have a positive effect on the discourse in Egypt—even if only slightly.

In fact, Hassanein and Winter believe there is potential for relations between the two countries to improve, since the war has given Egypt a chance to demonstrate to both Israel and the world that it is a more helpful partner than Qatar, its rival.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”