Jordan Helps Israel and Condemns It

During the Iranian attack last Saturday, Jordanian jets took to the skies to shoot down munitions aimed at Israel, bringing into stark relief the contradictions in the country’s foreign policy. Lahav Harkov explains:

If anyone thought Jordan’s part in intercepting drones Iran launched at Israel on the weekend marked a turning point in the Hashemite kingdom’s relations with the Jewish state, the Jordanian foreign minister Ayman Safadi immediately tried to dispel that notion, insisting in media interviews that Israel was still the real problem.

Leading figures in Jordan have for months been leveling harsh criticism on Israel and Amman called off an energy and water deal in response to the war in Gaza, amid pressure from a population that has largely been unsupportive of relations between the countries since they signed an agreement in 1994.

The kingdom realizes, however, that it is dependent on Israel and the U.S. for its own security—and, like any country, doesn’t relish its airspace being violated by a hostile power. And there is no doubt that is what Iran is:

Iran has long worked to gain a foothold in Jordan and to undermine the stability of its monarchy. Israel’s 300 km-border with Jordan is its longest frontier, such that a stronger Iranian or Iran-backed presence would pose a serious threat to the Jewish state. . . . A week before the missile and drone attack on Israel, Iranian media reported that Hizballah is ready to arm 12,000 “Islamist resistance” fighters in Jordan to overthrow the monarchy.

Read more at Jewish Insider

More about: Hizballah, Iran, Israeli Security, Jordan

 

Only Hamas’s Defeat Can Pave the Path to Peace

Opponents of the IDF’s campaign in Gaza often appeal to two related arguments: that Hamas is rooted in a set of ideas and thus cannot be defeated militarily, and that the destruction in Gaza only further radicalizes Palestinians, thus increasing the threat to Israel. Rejecting both lines of thinking, Ghaith al-Omar writes:

What makes Hamas and similar militant organizations effective is not their ideologies but their ability to act on them. For Hamas, the sustained capacity to use violence was key to helping it build political power. Back in the 1990s, Hamas’s popularity was at its lowest point, as most Palestinians believed that liberation could be achieved by peaceful and diplomatic means. Its use of violence derailed that concept, but it established Hamas as a political alternative.

Ever since, the use of force and violence has been an integral part of Hamas’s strategy. . . . Indeed, one lesson from October 7 is that while Hamas maintains its military and violent capabilities, it will remain capable of shaping the political reality. To be defeated, Hamas must be denied that. This can only be done through the use of force.

Any illusions that Palestinian and Israeli societies can now trust one another or even develop a level of coexistence anytime soon should be laid to rest. If it can ever be reached, such an outcome is at best a generational endeavor. . . . Hamas triggered war and still insists that it would do it all again given the chance, so it will be hard-pressed to garner a following from Palestinians in Gaza who suffered so horribly for its decision.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict