In the absence of a commission of inquiry, Israelis are drawing their own conclusions about October 7. A great number believe that the mistake lay in taking a defensive posture toward Hamas, and that the obvious lesson is that Hizballah should be preempted before it attempts an even more terrible attack on Israel’s north. At the same time, Israel’s war-weary citizen-soldiers and their families have little appetite for more fighting, even if they fear it may be necessary. Hizballah, for its part, fired a missile on Friday night that struck on Israeli barn and killed two horses. And yesterday, it launched a drone attack that left eighteen soldiers wounded.

The U.S., meanwhile, appears desperate to avoid a showdown in Lebanon. Hal Brands argues that the White House might be able to prevent one, if it takes a very different tack:

The key is ruthless coercive diplomacy. Hizballah is more likely to pull back, and Iran is more likely to counsel retrenchment, if they are convinced that America will aid Israel resolutely.

Biden must make clear that he will give Israel the time and resources it needs to decimate Hizballah—that there will be no early calls for a cease-fire, and that American bombs and bullets will flow. He should make clear, moreover, that Washington will inflict crushing punishment on Iran if Iran enters the conflict—as a way of convincing Hizballah that if it fights, it fights alone.

Unfortunately, the administration’s body language signals something different—a transparent, almost desperate desire for calm in the run-up to a crucial presidential vote. When Iran attacked Israel in April, for instance, the U.S.—after organizing a successful defense against Tehran’s drones and missiles—pivoted immediately to restraining the Israeli response.

As the risks in the Middle East rise, helping Israel make a credible threat of war may be the price of convincing Hizballah and Iran that they should swerve to avoid it.

As Israel moves closer to dismantling Hamas’s rule in Gaza, it will soon have to start implementing an alternative form of local governance. To do so it will likely draw on a confidential report produced by a team of Israeli scholars that has been circulating in the highest ranks of the government and military for the past few weeks.

One of the report’s authors, Netta Barak-Corren, discussed some of its suggestions recently with Dan Senor, addressing what can be learned from what the U.S. got right in Japan and Germany after World War II, and got wrong in Iraq and Afghanistan: