Contemplating the increased hostility directed by French Muslims toward their country, and the rise of France’s anti-Muslim National Front, Ben Judah examines the fate of the Jews in a fractured republic:

Can a Jew still live safely in a banlieue [as the poor, immigrant suburbs of Paris are called]? Since 2000, when banlieue anti-Semitism began to flare up alongside the Palestinian intifada, the number of Jewish families in [the banlieue of] Aulnay-sous-Bois fell from 600 to 100, in Le Blanc-Mesnil from 300 to 100, in Clichy-Sous-Bois from 400 to 80, and in La Courneuve from 300 to 80. French Jews call this flight internal aliyah.

This is why they move: in 2014, 51 percent of reported racist incidents in France targeted Jews. On average a Jew is assaulted in France every day. And this means [anti-Semitic violence] touches most families. A recent poll found that 74 percent of Jews who wore traditional skullcaps and 20 percent who didn’t reported being attacked. . . .

[The French pollster Jérôme] Fourquet’s research shows that French Jews are moving from areas run by Communist mayors—twinned with Palestinian camps, where Palestinian war heroes hold honorary citizenship, and regular exhibitions are held on the anniversary of the “Nakba”—to areas where there are right-wing mayors, twinned with Israel. Internal aliyah—not to Israel, or English-speaking countries—is the largest movement of French Jews.

“Yet what we found in our interviews in the Jewish community,” says Fourquet, “was more and more Jews say, there is us [the Jews], them [the Muslims], and you—the ethnic French. Yet again, in our interviews with [French Jews], they talk as if they are canaries in the coalmine. This comes up a lot: [an attitude of] ‘you’ll see it when we’re gone and you’ll be left with them.’ . . . The sense of a common French destiny is vanishing in our surveys.”

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”