Last week, after a suicide bomber attacked a Turkish town near the Syrian border, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan allowed the U.S. to launch aerial attacks on Islamic State (IS) from Turkish bases. Although this tactical aid is important, writes Michael Rubin, it does not mean that Turkey has suddenly gone back to being an American ally:

Has Erdogan finally recognized that his passive, if not active, support for IS has endangered all Turks with a jihadist backlash?

[Although] those directing the U.S. fight against IS . . . might applaud Turkey’s sudden cooperation, . . . they don’t recognize that Turkey might be pursuing very different goals. While Turkish planes have launched some attacks on IS targets in Syria, they have directed far more sorties bombing the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) insurgents and fighters in northern Iraq. . . .

Another way to look at this is that Turkey is bombing the same Kurdish Peshmerga [fighters] who have been most successful at rolling back IS in Syria and around Mount Sinjar in Iraq. By such a flagrant violation of the peace process with the PKK, Erdogan also is preparing the groundwork for dissolving the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the Kurdish party whose members generally sympathize with the PKK and whose election success in June denied Erdogan’s followers a majority for the first time since they came to power in 2002.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”