Since it first began fighting Islamic State (IS) in 2014, Washington has been conducting its campaign based on a series of assumptions: that IS poses the region’s most serious threat to the U.S.; that IS can be defeated by dislodging it from the key cities of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria; that the U.S. must cooperate with Russia and Iran in fighting IS; and that al-Qaeda in Syria is a secondary threat that can be contained by airstrikes. In a detailed report, Jennifer Cafarella, Kimberly Kagan, and Frederick W. Kagan argue that every one of these assumptions is false. Furthermore, they contend, although the Trump administration, by removing excessive restraints on attacking the enemy, has improved tactically on the approach of the Obama administration, it is maintaining the same flawed strategy.

Had the U.S. helped Iraqis and Syrians retake Raqqa and Mosul quickly in 2014, IS might well have collapsed. Retaking those cities three years later without a viable plan for what comes next will not have the same result. . . . IS holds other terrain in both [Iraq and Syria]. It will retain, most importantly, the ability to penetrate a Sunni Arab community that remains under siege even after its largest bases fall. IS is also actively exporting its vision and capabilities to external branches and transforming its idea of a caliphate from a physical one to a virtual, organized community that carries forward [its] objectives independent of the [central] organization. Defeating IS in Iraq and Syria may no longer be sufficient to defeat the global organization. . . .

Al-Qaeda, however, is more dangerous than IS. . . . Al-Qaeda has amassed an army in northern Syria, exploits vulnerable Sunni populations, and is poised to capitalize on IS setbacks on the battlefield. . . .

[Furthermore], the Obama administration’s actions amounted to a partnership with Moscow and Tehran. The blatant war crimes those regimes have committed in Syria have radicalized the Sunni Arab communities that IS and al-Qaeda prey on and control. The Sunni Arab community—the population critical to defeating Salafist jihadists decisively—now perceives the United States as complicit in a Russo-Iranian campaign to destroy it.

The Russo-Iranian coalition empowered by the previous administration has proved damaging in other ways. . . . Russia and Iran are building a regional order based on their shared near-term interests, which will not diverge any time soon. This developing system denies America the freedom to protect its own interests. The Russo-Iranian coalition will make it more difficult for the U.S. to respond to terror threats against it, defend key allies such as Israel, and ensure unfettered access to trade routes the U.S. economy depends on.

The report goes on to lay out a strategy for defeating Islamic State and al-Qaeda while reducing Russian and Iranian influence, through a gradual campaign based on building alliances with the local Sunni populations.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”