Last week’s earthquake, which wreaked destruction on both sides of the Turkish-Syrian border, served as a reminder of the parlous situation in which Syria finds itself, and also of the difficulties of providing the country with humanitarian assistance without simply enriching Bashar al-Assad. Behind this state of affairs is the fact that the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011, is not yet over. Amir Taheri observes that Iran, Russia, Turkey, and the U.S. have all—each in its own way—claimed victory, but none has won it.

Despite pumping billions into Bashar al-Assad’s coffers, including $140 million in payments to his entourage by the United Nations, and at least $4 billion in “oil on credit” from Iran, not to mention earnings from allegedly smuggling drugs, the Assad outfit does not seem remotely interested in any state-building scheme. According to best estimates, 90 percent of the population in areas nominally controlled by Assad has fallen below the poverty line. In those areas—roughly a quarter of what was known in colonial times as “useful Syria”—more than 50 percent of basic infrastructure is still in ruins. Worse still, in some areas, even the semblance of law and order created by anti-Assad armed groups has disappeared.

The latest blow to Assad’s position has come from Tehran. Faced with a deepening economic crisis of their own, the mullahs have decided to end their “oil on credit” scheme. Last October they announced that an oil tanker touching the Syrian coast under that scheme would be the last. In the future, Damascus would have to pay in advance. They also announced that the sweetheart oil price of $35 per barrel was doubled to $75. Whichever way one looks, Syria is still at war; it is a running wound that infects large chunks of the Middle East, the eastern Mediterranean, and beyond.

With every day that passes the task of rebuilding Syria as a normal state becomes harder. And, yet, there is no sign that powers capable of making a difference are willing or able to develop a strategy for healing that wound. The . . . main reason may be the Biden administration’s obsession with making a deal with Tehran in the hope that it would smooth the way for normalization in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.