On May 19, the Arab League held its annual summit in the Saudi city of Jeddah, attended by the Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad for the first time since 2011—when his government was expelled because of its bloody attempts to suppress a popular uprising. Mohammed Alyahya takes this step as a sign of the emergence of a “new Middle East.”

Through brute force, and the unwavering support of his patrons—Russia and China—Bashar al-Assad has managed to prevail in his war against his own people, delivering a strategic victory to the Russia-Iran axis that will allow him to preside indefinitely over a tattered and fractured Syria. Giving Syria a place at the table is recognition of a reality that the Syrian dictator has forged out of steel and blood. It is also a victory for his patrons who facilitated his murderous behavior. It is reasonable to expect that future would-be Arab strongmen are paying close attention to these ugly lessons.

While initiatives led by U.S. allies focused in the past on maintaining the U.S. security order, this Arab League summit brings together a region that can no longer be easily divided into well-marked camps policed by superpower patrons. The most notable feature of this new landscape is a competition for influence, power, and resources that is open to all players.

While open competition is not in itself a bad thing, the prospect of a regional free-for-all carries considerable risks—both to American interests and to regional stability. Without clear alliances and rules, the threat of armed conflict can only increase. Meanwhile, the United States lacks a coherent strategy to manage its own remaining, quite large interests in the region. . . . Beijing has capitalized on the power vacuum left by the United States, most recently by brokering an agreement in Beijing between Riyadh and Tehran.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”