As part of a possible deal that would involve normalization of relations with Israel, the Saudi crown prince Mohammad bin Salman has requested that the U.S. aid his kingdom in acquiring the means to enrich uranium and produce nuclear energy. The second part of the request, explain Anthony Ruggiero and Andrea Stricker, is entirely reasonable, but the first would give Riyadh the capacity to produce nuclear fuel both for reactors and for bombs. They suggest a better alternative, which could be part of an improved U.S. approach to the Middle East:

[T]he U.S. should offer to sell the kingdom a fleet of reactors from Westinghouse, an American company. Alternatively, the U.S. and South Korea could undertake a joint reactor venture. Seoul is already bidding on the Saudi reactor project. It has built three reactors in the United Arab Emirates and is working on a fourth. America should also offer its nuclear safety, security, and technical expertise, while assisting Riyadh’s uranium mining and milling endeavors.

Instead of enriching this uranium at home, however, Saudi Arabia would ship out the material to Europe’s Urenco consortium or the United States for nuclear-fuel fabrication. Washington might also offer an assured reactor-fuel supply, should the kingdom require it. . . . In securing these commitments, America would retain its “gold standard” of nonproliferation in the Middle East and prevent the spread of enrichment technology.

To seal the deal, Washington must reimpose United Nations sanctions against Iran, including a prohibition against Tehran’s uranium enrichment. This would mitigate the Saudis’ drive to match Tehran and convince the kingdom of American seriousness about reversing Iran’s proliferation efforts.

If the administration pursues such a plan, America will meet U.S., Saudi, and Israeli security objectives as well as win bipartisan support in a skeptical U.S. Congress, where Riyadh has few consistent friends.

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.