Ten years ago, it seemed to Steven A. Cook that the world’s second most populous nation had little interest in the Middle East. Important economic relationships—not least the purchase of oil—bound India to the region, but the country’s rulers paid little attention to its geopolitics. Now all that has changed, writes Cook:

India-Israel ties are perhaps the most well-developed of New Delhi’s relations in the region. . . . Israel was among India’s top-three arms suppliers in 2021, and recent Indian news reports indicate that the two countries are exploring the coproduction of weapons systems. Also in the past, India’s business community shied away from investing in Israel, given the country’s small market and controversial politics (to many in India), but that may be changing.

When it comes to the Persian Gulf, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are aggressively seeking ways to expand relations with India. It is a significant shift because both countries, but particularly the latter, have long aligned with Pakistan. The pivot to India stems in part from a common interest in containing Islamist extremism, but much of the pull is economic. . . . The Indians and Emiratis have also developed their ties through what in Washington is called I2U2—a grouping of Israel, India, the UAE, and the United States—which seeks to leverage the combined technological know-how and private capital to address alternative energy, agriculture, trade, infrastructure development, and more.

It is tempting for U.S. policymakers and analysts to view India’s growing role in the region through the prism of great-power competition with China. [Yet] it seems unlikely that New Delhi wants to be the strategic partner that Washington imagines. The kind of relationship some in Washington seem to have in mind is not a natural place for India. . . . And when it comes to the Middle East, India diverges sharply from the United States (and Israel) on Iran.

If the United States’ Middle Eastern partners are looking for an alternative to Washington, it is better that New Delhi is among the choices. The United States may no longer be the undisputed big dog in the region, but as long as India expands its presence in the Middle East, neither Russia nor China can assume that role.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”