For many years, Tehran has been developing sophisticated missiles, usually by modifying North Korean models. Its most recent products may be particularly well designed for evading the detection mechanisms and missile shields employed by the U.S. and its allies. Behnam Ben Taleblu explains why European leaders should be worried about these weapons:

While Iran’s much reported potential transfer of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia is yet to materialize, the causal force behind this is likely not Tehran’s fear of transgressing some unwritten agreement that’s being secretly negotiated with Washington. Instead, the Islamic Republic may well be waiting for the termination of UN prohibitions on ballistic-missile testing and transfers this October, before further arming Moscow with precision-strike systems. In fact, Iran may even want the move to be deemed “licit” to prevent any predicate for renewed pressure—but in the interim, it has not been idle.

In late May, Iran launched a new ballistic missile simultaneously dubbed the “Khorramshahr-4” and the “Khaybar.” While the former name commemorates an Iranian city liberated during the Iran-Iraq War—a conflict that birthed the revolutionary regime’s interest in missiles as a supplement for airpower—the latter name comes from a Jewish stronghold in Arabia that was overrun by the Prophet Mohammad’s armies fourteen centuries ago, a salient event for Iran’s current revolutionary leaders who seek Israel’s destruction.

Iran has refined the weapon, developing a variant with a lighter warhead that could travel up to 3,000 kilometers—a move that, in effect, took it from being able to target parts of Southern Europe to being able, potentially, to strike nearly all of Central Europe.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.