For many years, Tehran has been developing sophisticated missiles, usually by modifying North Korean models. Its most recent products may be particularly well designed for evading the detection mechanisms and missile shields employed by the U.S. and its allies. Behnam Ben Taleblu explains why European leaders should be worried about these weapons:

While Iran’s much reported potential transfer of short-range ballistic missiles to Russia is yet to materialize, the causal force behind this is likely not Tehran’s fear of transgressing some unwritten agreement that’s being secretly negotiated with Washington. Instead, the Islamic Republic may well be waiting for the termination of UN prohibitions on ballistic-missile testing and transfers this October, before further arming Moscow with precision-strike systems. In fact, Iran may even want the move to be deemed “licit” to prevent any predicate for renewed pressure—but in the interim, it has not been idle.

In late May, Iran launched a new ballistic missile simultaneously dubbed the “Khorramshahr-4” and the “Khaybar.” While the former name commemorates an Iranian city liberated during the Iran-Iraq War—a conflict that birthed the revolutionary regime’s interest in missiles as a supplement for airpower—the latter name comes from a Jewish stronghold in Arabia that was overrun by the Prophet Mohammad’s armies fourteen centuries ago, a salient event for Iran’s current revolutionary leaders who seek Israel’s destruction.

Iran has refined the weapon, developing a variant with a lighter warhead that could travel up to 3,000 kilometers—a move that, in effect, took it from being able to target parts of Southern Europe to being able, potentially, to strike nearly all of Central Europe.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”