Until at least the 18th century, Jewish communities and rabbinic courts could impose consequences on a husband who refused to give his wife a get, or bill of divorce, and thus prevented her from remarrying. Outside of Israel, Orthodox communities today must instead rely on coordinated social pressure. Earlier this month, a New Jersey court overturned a previous ruling that effectively outlawed some of these remedies. Michael A. Helfand explains:

[At present], there are Jewish organizations dedicated to remedying these cases of agunot [wives “chained” to their husbands] who use well-attended rallies, among other tactics, to pressure husbands to give the get and thereby release their wives from the marriage. And in more recent years, a growing number of (largely female) social-media influencers have sought to use their online presence to further encourage husbands to end marriages that, but for the get, have for all intents and purposes ended long ago.

But in the case of S.B.B. v. L.B.B., an initial New Jersey trial court decision held that for a woman to encourage this sort of coordinated pressure could constitute legally prohibited harassment. The defendant in the case had disseminated a video asking members of the Jewish community to “press” her husband to give her a get. . . . In turn, the judge granted the husband a final restraining order because this sort of coordinated campaign could “incite violence.” She also awarded the husband attorney’s fees and monetary damages.

The appeals court, however, reversed the decision, concluding that the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech protected the dissemination of such videos. . . .  Essential to the appellate court’s decision was the fact that the video was not “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action [nor] likely to incite or produce such action.” If it had been, then the protections of the First Amendment might very well have fallen to the wayside. But the video, in the assessment of the appellate court, did no such thing.

Attempts to quash such efforts under the guise of harassment will not withstand constitutional scrutiny.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.