In the Middle East, China seeks to weaken or displace American influence and to stay on good terms with both Iran and its Persian Gulf rivals. Thus, after the October 7 attacks, Beijing reacted with boilerplate about the need for both sides to exercise restraint and the importance of a two-state solution. Galia Lavi explains that this was part of Chinese officials’ mishandling of the situation:

As Beijing saw it, the current fighting was no different from past conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians. Therefore, it would use it to display its support for the Palestinians and smile at the Muslim countries in the Middle East, while taunting the United States and presenting itself as a peace-seeking alternative to U.S. hegemony, which, [according to Chinese propaganda], foments strife and quarrels.

But Beijing . . . did not expect such a determined U.S. response, including clear declarations of support for Israel, criticisms of Hamas terror, the dispatch of two aircraft carriers to the region, the airlift of military equipment, and no less important, a blitz of visits by senior U.S. officials to countries of the region, bringing the message that the United States is present in the area with all its power and will defend its allies, actively if necessary.

Thus, China found itself in an uncomfortable position. On the one hand, the events of October 7 shattered the concept that China has vigorously promoted in recent years, whereby the United States has withdrawn from the Middle East and China has increased its presence there. . . . On the other hand, the anti-Hamas position of countries in the Middle East has highlighted China’s support for Syria, Iran, and Russia—countries that help China create an axis of opposition to the United States, and in the current situation are also seen as supporters of terror.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.