So far, the U.S. has responded to attacks by Iran-backed terrorists either by inaction or by attacks on the groups themselves, while avoiding what Naftali Bennett called “the head of the octopus.” Oved Lobel argues that deterrence

can only be achieved by also targeting those actually responsible for these attacks: the Islamic regime ruling Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). For too long, the U.S. has been engaging in the IRGC’s shell game, pretending that the Houthis, more formally known as Ansar Allah, were a Yemeni problem. The reality is that, like Hizballah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank, and various militias in Iraq and Syria, Ansar Allah is an IRGC problem. . . .

Imagine if the situation were reversed and the Islamic Republic treated every branch of the U.S. military as an independent organization, each merely backed by or allied with the U.S. government. Whenever the U.S. Air Force struck a regime target, for instance, it would respond only against the air force, never the U.S. Army or Navy, and in a very narrow fashion, with [the U.S.] itself never suffering any kind of retaliation. At no stage would they all be treated as a unitary enemy whose decision-making center was in Washington.

If this seems patently absurd, that is because it is, and it is precisely what the U.S. is doing by trying to compartmentalize the components of the IRGC and deter each one as if it weren’t part of a whole. This approach, for obvious reasons, isn’t working in Iraq and Syria and it clearly won’t work in Yemen.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”