Unlike most other ḥasidic leaders who sought isolation from secular Zionism upon arrival in the land of Israel, the late Pashkaner rebbe, Yisrael Friedman, became closely affiliated with the socialist and secularist pioneer organization Hashomer Hatsa’ir, settled on a kibbutz, began using the Hebrew version of his last name (“Ben-Shalom”), and even studied at a university, eventually becoming a professor. Yakov Z. Mayer explains how Friedman’s historical expertise on the talmudic period merged seamlessly with his particularly ḥasidic method of Talmud study:

[When Friedman taught] Talmud, every sage mentioned in the [text] was richly portrayed, following the [talmudic] dictum, “One who relates a statement in the name of its author should envision the author of the statement as though he is standing before him.” To perceive the author of the statement, Friedman said, one must imagine the teachers and disciples of the statement’s author. Where did he live? Where did he study? Whom did he marry? Who were his children? What did he eat, drink, and wear? What did his beard look like? No detail is too marginal, no angle unexplored.

Envisioning the author of the talmudic statement before us was not simply a trick to spice up our learning; Friedman taught us that this is how Ḥasidim study the Talmud. . . . When Friedman called forth the images of the talmudic discussants, [it was clear to his students that] he was there with them, and [they] believed that the sages’ lips were whispering from the grave. . . .

In a certain sense Friedman’s [major scholarly work], The House of Shammai and the Zealots’ Struggle against Rome, reflects this style of study. He enters the era and describes [the sages of the school of Shammai] in their historical context. . . . The ḥasidic scholastic principle of envisioning the author of the statement was transformed, in Friedman’s hands, into a critical, academic method. . . .

He once said that the academy has the power to suck out one’s soul, so if someone survived it, he either has no soul or has a soul that is so deeply embedded that it does not want to come out. He did not sing the praises of the academy, but of ḥasidic Torah study, which is connected in so many overt and covert ways to historical Torah study.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.