A number of commentators have noted that Jews in Western countries are increasingly voting for conservative parties and candidates; American Jews, however, have maintained their overwhelming preference for liberals. Evelyn Gordon argues that this is not because American Jews are different from other Jews, but because America is different from other liberal democracies:

[N]on-Jewish Americans are overwhelmingly pro-Israel. That certainly isn’t the case in Europe. And as an annual BBC poll shows, it isn’t even true in Canada and Australia, whose current conservative governments are staunchly pro-Israel. Consequently, Democratic politicians [in the U.S.] are rarely as anti-Israel as their counterparts overseas, because being anti-Israel is still bad politics in America . . . Nor does the American left’s animus toward Israel spill over into blatant anti-Semitism as often as it does in, say, Europe. So, for now, liberal American Jews still feel as if they can support the left without having to repudiate their Zionism or their Judaism—something that’s increasingly no longer possible overseas.

But even in America, that may not be true for long. . . . Thus, if American Jewish liberals don’t want to go the way of their counterparts overseas, . . . they need to mount an urgent campaign to convince their own political camp that any good liberal should also be pro-Israel. That’s far from an impossible case to make, since it has the advantage of being true. . . . But conservatives can’t do the job for them.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.