On Monday, in response to recent reports that the U.S. has withheld shipments of ammunition to Israel, Senators Joni Ernst and Ted Budd sent a letter to the president asking what was withheld and why. Richard Goldberg argues that the Biden administration only undermines itself with such moves, both as a matter of politics and as a matter of policy:

Biden’s strategy . . . works against his objectives. Every time he puts pressure on Israel to cut a deal with Hamas and hold back military operations, Hamas feels less pressure to cut a deal—opting instead for head fakes like Monday’s claim that it would accept a ceasefire proposal Israel had never offered. Leaks suggest that Hamas sympathizers inside the State Department are pressing for an aid cut-off—perhaps via a Biden-mandated report to Congress due [today] on Israel’s compliance with international law.

The president insists he wants to see the release of Israeli hostages and a transition to a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. He might achieve those goals by putting pressure on Hamas’s sponsors—Iran, Qatar, Lebanon, and Turkey—instead of Hamas’s victim. By playing for an Israeli surrender to Hamas, however, Biden all but guarantees continued conflict in the Middle East, and continued unrest from his left flank at home.

There is more, Goldberg explains, that the legislative branch can and should do:

Congress can intervene, however, either through oversight hearings or the power of the purse. Considering the legislature just brokered a compromise on a $95 billion emergency supplemental that included aid to Israel, holding up assistance would contravene the will of Congress. It would be justified in retaliating by holding up a wide range of spending for any Biden-controlled department.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.