On Monday, in response to recent reports that the U.S. has withheld shipments of ammunition to Israel, Senators Joni Ernst and Ted Budd sent a letter to the president asking what was withheld and why. Richard Goldberg argues that the Biden administration only undermines itself with such moves, both as a matter of politics and as a matter of policy:

Biden’s strategy . . . works against his objectives. Every time he puts pressure on Israel to cut a deal with Hamas and hold back military operations, Hamas feels less pressure to cut a deal—opting instead for head fakes like Monday’s claim that it would accept a ceasefire proposal Israel had never offered. Leaks suggest that Hamas sympathizers inside the State Department are pressing for an aid cut-off—perhaps via a Biden-mandated report to Congress due [today] on Israel’s compliance with international law.

The president insists he wants to see the release of Israeli hostages and a transition to a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. He might achieve those goals by putting pressure on Hamas’s sponsors—Iran, Qatar, Lebanon, and Turkey—instead of Hamas’s victim. By playing for an Israeli surrender to Hamas, however, Biden all but guarantees continued conflict in the Middle East, and continued unrest from his left flank at home.

There is more, Goldberg explains, that the legislative branch can and should do:

Congress can intervene, however, either through oversight hearings or the power of the purse. Considering the legislature just brokered a compromise on a $95 billion emergency supplemental that included aid to Israel, holding up assistance would contravene the will of Congress. It would be justified in retaliating by holding up a wide range of spending for any Biden-controlled department.

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.