A group of Israeli scientists has recently developed an improved method of radiocarbon dating, using it to form a more accurate chronology of First Temple-era Jerusalem. Gavriel Fiske explains:

The researchers studied 100 samples of securely dated and scientifically excavated organic material and concluded that ancient Jerusalem was larger and more urban than previously proven, especially during the 10th-12th centuries BCE, during what is commonly thought to be the time of King David and King Solomon.

The results of the study have potential implications not just in the fields of Israeli and biblical archaeology, but for Iron Age archaeology as a whole, as the researchers claim to have developed techniques that overcome an issue known as the “Hallstatt plateau,” in which traditional radiocarbon dating proves to be inaccurate when analyzing material from around 800 to 400 BCE, the late Iron Age.

The specific results for Jerusalem show some differences from the usually accepted sequence of events. In particular, what is known as King Hezekiah’s Wall, or the Broad Wall, a large fortification discovered in the 1970s in the Jerusalem Old City, has been thought to have been built by Hezekiah as part of new city defenses against an Assyrian invasion, as described in Chronicles.

However, the researchers’ dating techniques—which require excavated material from a scientific, securely stratified excavation—put the construction of the wall decades earlier, during the reign of King Uzziah, who is known to have rebuilt and refurbished the city after a major earthquake.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.