Last month, Israel’s High Court of Justice struck down the deal Prime Minister Netanyahu concluded with two energy companies to begin drilling for and exporting natural gas located beneath the country’s coastal waters—a deal arrived at after more than six years of wrangling with both private corporations and the Knesset and capable of yielding considerable diplomatic and economic benefits. Akiva Bigman examines the court’s opinion, written by its vice president, Elyakim Rubinstein, and finds it irrational to the point of incoherence, arguing that it is a particularly egregious example of Israel’s imperious judiciary flexing its muscles:

While [Rubinstein] admits that there is no harm to individual rights or minority rights [caused by the gas deal], that fact does not really interest him. As far as he is concerned, the government lacks the authority to make a decision on the gas issue “since our interest is in the collective rights of the public”—as if it is not the public that elected this government. . . .

[Furthermore, Rubinstein’s] ruling includes insinuations and speculations that might be appropriate in a tabloid, but that have no place in a supreme-court verdict. . . . [To] illustrate: the Knesset [approved] the gas deal last September, and the Knesset plenum approved the government’s decision to regulate the gas market. . . . However, [Rubinstein writes] in his colorful language, . . . “[Knesset approval] will not be the source of legal salvation for the state.” Why not? “A general vote on the ‘finished product’ is not like a full legislative process with all its stages.”

Here His Honor begins to tell a tale of conspiracy theories bordering on mild paranoia. In contrast to a government decision, which is apparently made in darkness, “the legislative process is transparent and in full view of the public eye,” says the supreme-court justice, elaborating: “The legislative process also limits the maneuverability of organized interest groups in their attempt to influence the administrative authority to make decisions that will serve them.”

You read this right. The vice-president of the supreme court is implicitly accusing the government of Israel of making decisions on the gas issue on the basis of inappropriate considerations. . . .

Rubinstein repeats these insinuations even more sharply later on, noting that without primary legislation, an opening “could be created . . . for institutional or personal corruption.” Furthermore, after reviewing the lengthy process that led to the agreement, which included the resignation of senior officials, the transfer of the economy minister’s powers to Prime Minister Netanyahu, and other moves, he concludes: “The cumulative circumstances raise questions and illustrate that the Knesset needs to exercise more oversight.”

This is a collection of serious, problematic, and outrageous insinuations, tacit defamation, and complete deviation from authority. If Rubinstein believes that there was any fault with the government’s conduct, if he has even the slightest suspicion of “institutional or personal” corruption, His Honor is invited to inform the police or the attorney general. . . . If he has no such concrete suspicion and no evidence that the law has been broken, let him not intervene in the actions of the executive branch. A supreme-court ruling is not an editorial in [an Israeli newspaper], and it must not become a caricature that makes a mockery of the rule of law and the elected government.

The bottom line is that, in the absence of orderly explanations, and against the background of a collection of arbitrary decisions, one gets the impression that the supreme court struck down the gas deal for one reason only: because it could.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.