Last week, Tehran confirmed its plans to purchase 100 aircraft from the American aviation company Boeing. The U.S. Treasury Department has already granted permission for such sales by U.S. corporations, and the terms of the Iran deal allow American banks to finance them. Legal though the transaction may be, however, its results are bound to be bad for American interests, for the people of Syria, and perhaps for Boeing itself. Emanuele Ottolenghi writes:

Iran certainly requires new aircraft for its legitimate transportation [needs]. But . . . Tehran also needs these aircraft to run an illicit logistical operation that involves the ongoing airlift of weapons and militias from its airports in Tehran and Abadan. These flights are providing fresh supplies and recruits to the Syrian Armed Forces, Hizballah, and Iran’s own Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—all of whom are fighting in the Syrian civil war that has claimed the lives of 400,000 since 2011. . . .

Should it be proved that Iran Air is carrying weapons, supplies, or forces for the Syrian regime, the company would risk getting slapped with renewed sanctions. . . . [Such] deals could [also] make aircraft manufacturers unwittingly complicit in Iran’s support for atrocities and war crimes in Syria and for Hizballah’s terror activities, [thus] exposing them to future sanctions. More likely is the threat of lawsuits from attorneys trying to collect $50 billion of outstanding judgments for victims of Iranian terrorism. These could create public-relations nightmares, if not costly legal battles.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.