Gadi Eisenkot, the chief of staff of the IDF, recently announced a plan to expand tuition assistance—currently offered only to those who served in elite units—to all combat veterans and, eventually, to all veterans. To Daniel Gordis, this new plan, admirable though it may be, is indicative of a broader crisis regarding the social standing of the Israeli military:

The IDF has long been a hallowed institution. Criticism of the “people’s army,” in a country under constant threat and in which there has always been a universal draft, was once considered a violation of a fundamental Israeli ethos.

Those days, however, are long gone. Although universal in theory, the draft is anything but that. The vast majority of ultra-Orthodox young men do not serve; neither do [most] Israeli Arabs. Increasing numbers of secular Israelis, largely around Tel Aviv, are dodging the draft. Those who do serve, and their parents, increasingly speak of the importance of an “equal sharing of the burden,” a phrase now ubiquitous. For many Israeli families, the unequal sharing of the burden has cast a cloud over the IDF. . . .

Should the public continue to sour on the IDF, Israel will face a serious challenge. Few countries must maintain their revolutionary enthusiasm and spirit of sacrifice for seven decades. Israel has had to, and that is unlikely to change. . . . With Hizballah and Hamas armed to the teeth and digging tunnels, and with Iran still pursuing a nuclear weapon, Israelis need not only their army but also a renewed devotion to its excellence.

In some ways, ironically, the tuition plan may exacerbate the problem. Eisenkot is playing into the “ask what your army can do for you” syndrome, acknowledging that the more classic Israeli attitude which demanded that young people “ask what they could do for their army” has largely faded. The implications of that shift in attitude for Israeli society at large could be profound for a state that is likely to have to battle for its existence for as far as the eye can see.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.