Considering several recent Supreme Court decisions, together with a growing hostility on both the radical left and the radical right to freedom of religion, Robert P. George sets forth an impassioned and thoughtful argument as to why this particular freedom is both socially beneficial and sacred:

The mainstream view among liberal political and legal theorists since at least the days of [the 20th-century political philosopher John] Rawls has been to deny religion’s status as a category of human activity that is in any way special. Religion, such theorists hold, is like any other deep passion or commitment people might have. Often these theorists agree (and rightly) that religious liberty deserves protection. But the grounds they offer for defending religious liberty rarely extend beyond a concern for avoiding the calamities that religious disagreement and conflict have wrought throughout human history. This is, to be sure, a reason for protecting religious liberty. But it is, alas, defeasible.

In his alternative view, George argues that religious freedom is necessary because religion is in fact special:

Human rights, such as the right to life or the right to religious freedom, are grounded in and shaped by the human goods they protect. The right to freedom of speech, for example, is grounded in several goods: political stability, the search for truth and the appropriation and dissemination of it, and so on. Indeed, only by reference to human goods can any right be defined and justified.

And it matters to the identification and defense of the right to religious liberty that religion is yet another irreducible aspect of human well-being and fulfillment—a basic human good.

One need not be an expert in international law to see the absurdity of the ICC prosecutor’s determination that the leaders of Hamas and the leaders of Israel are equally guilty of war crimes. It takes only a little more knowledge to understand that the court has no jurisdiction over Israel, which is not a signatory to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding treaty. In a careful analysis, Avraham Russell Shalev outlines some of the many legal holes in this case, and observes that the problems are inherent in the court itself:

A review of the ICC’s relationship towards Israel over its two decades of existence demonstrates a fundamental bias and double standard toward the Jewish state. This bias is not a function of any specific prosecutor. Rather, it is an institutional feature, found even in the Rome Statute. . . . Israel initially refused to sign the Rome Statute as it became apparent that the Arab states had politicized the Rome Conference and introduced language that departed from existing international law specifically to criminalize Jewish communities in Judea and Samaria.

Therefore, argues Shalev, Jerusalem should deal with the case against it not as a legal problem, to which it would respond by dispatching lawyers to make carefully reasoned arguments, but as a political and diplomatic one. More specifically, he contends that

collaboration with the ICC will not reduce the very high chances of arrest warrants being issued against Israeli officials, but will give those charges great weight and legitimacy when they come. Instead, Israel must adopt a policy of non-cooperation and even offense.

And what does a policy of offense entail?

Israel has repeatedly stated that it does not recognize the ICC’s jurisdiction. Therefore, any legal proceedings are completely illegitimate and as such, the various legal bodies—the attorney general, the Justice Ministry’s International Affairs Office, the Foreign Ministry’s legal advisors, and the Military Advocate General’s International Law Department—will no longer communicate with the ICC. [In addition], the Knesset must pass legislation modeled on the American Service-Member’s Protection Act. This legislation would bar any government agency from cooperating with the ICC without a government decision.

While Israel has never accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has willingly accepted it. The court can hardly turn around now and deny jurisdiction to avoid prosecuting Palestinian crimes. . . . Palestinian nationals, acting on behalf of Hamas, Fatah, and other terrorist organizations, and with no affiliation, have carried out serious war crimes against Israelis and Palestinians. Israel must publicly demand that the ICC issue indictments against them.