Spread over an area that includes parts of Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran, the Kurds are fighting for their independence—and in some places for their lives—while trying to benefit from the current regional rivalries and chaos. Noting how much less sympathy they’ve generated than does another stateless group in the region, Eyal Zisser fears their hopes are likely to be dashed:

[O]ne cannot ignore the fact that the Kurds do not receive the same support and attention from the international media or the same affection that “enlightened circles” across the planet generously grant to the Palestinians. The world does not stand with the Kurds, and that mainly applies to global powers that have used them to advance their own interests but abandoned them in the moment of truth. And we can assume that in the future as well, the Kurds will again be left to their fate.

Here we have a large ethnic minority which is undeniably unique in both its history and culture, and yet is supported by no one in its struggle to receive its own state. . . .

The Kurds in Syria are currently in the eye of the storm. . . . [Now they] are maintaining a dialogue with the Syrian regime and with the Russians, who want to use them to hit the Syrian rebels—Arabs supported by Turkey and Arab states. Meanwhile, Washington has also come to their aid, coldly calculating that the Kurds can be used to fight Islamic State. As usual, however, when it comes to the Obama administration, American policy is shortsighted, merely capitalizing on a tactical and perhaps cynical opportunity that could end in the abandonment of the Kurds when American interests call for appeasing Turkey, or as part of a deal with Russia and the Assad regime to end the war in Syria.

It appears the regional and global game is too big for the Kurds. When they are called to the table once the fighting ends, they are liable to discover they were invited to be part of the menu, not a fellow victor [called] to feast on the spoils of war.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.