For years, Iran was the chief sponsor of Hamas, supplying it with cash and arms. But when the terrorist group chose to oppose Bashar al-Assad, Tehran’s client, in the Syrian civil war, the ayatollahs shifted their support to Islamic Jihad, with which they soon had a similar falling-out. After trying to cultivate an alternative to both, the Islamic Republic is now reconciling with Islamic Jihad, as Khaled Abu Toameh explains:

For now, Iran is not prepared fully to bring Hamas back under its wing. Hamas, for the Iranians, is a “treacherous” movement, thanks to its periodic temporary ceasefires with Israel. The Iranian leaders want to see Hamas killing Jews every day, with no break. Ironically, it has become too “moderate” for the Iranian leadership. . . .

Whatever Iran’s intentions may be, one thing is clear: the Iranians are taking advantage of the nuclear deal to move forward with their efforts to increase their influence over some Arab and Islamic countries. Iran is also showing that it remains very keen on playing a role in the Israel-Palestinian conflict—one that emboldens radical groups that are bent on the destruction of Israel and that share the same values as Islamic State.

Iran’s latest courtship of Islamic Jihad is yet another attempt by the mullahs to deepen their infiltration of the Palestinian arena by supporting and arming any terror group that strives to smash Israel. For now, it seems that [the] scheme is working, largely thanks to the apathy of the international community, where many believe that Iran has been declawed by the nuclear deal.

But more Palestinian terrorist leaders may soon perform the “pilgrimage” to their masters in Tehran. If this keeps up, the Iranians themselves will make any Palestinian state that is created in the region their puppet. Their ultimate task, after all, is to use that state as a launching pad to destroy Israel. And the Iranians are prepared to fund and arm any Palestinian group that is willing to help achieve this goal.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.