Video footage recently obtained by the American military reportedly shows Islamic State (IS) fighters in Mosul forcing civilians into buildings—not to use them as human shields, but in the hope that these civilians will be killed by U.S. troops or their allies, thus generating outrage that will, in turn, discourage further attacks. As Evelyn Gordon notes, this practice, dubbed the “dead-baby strategy” by Alan Dershowitz, was pioneered by Hamas:

This tactic . . . was borrowed [by IS] because the world’s response to successive Hamas-Israel wars convinced IS that creating massive civilian casualties among residents of its own territory is an effective strategy. . . . [I]nstead of blaming Hamas for [deliberately jeopardizing its own subjects], the world largely blamed Israel. Mass demonstrations were held throughout the West condemning Israel; there were no mass demonstrations condemning Hamas. Journalists and “human-rights” organizations issued endless reports blaming Israel for the civilian casualties while ignoring or downplaying Hamas’s role in them. Western leaders repeatedly demanded that Israel show “restraint” and accused it of using disproportionate force. Israel, not Hamas, became the subject of a complaint to the International Criminal Court.

In short, by blaming Israel for civilian casualties that were . . . deliberately caused by Hamas’s actions, the world ensured that other terrorist organizations would adopt a similar strategy.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.