In the 1990s—following the Oslo Accords—Hamas launched lethally effective suicide bombings to murder Israelis; the attacks, which reached their bloody zenith during the second intifada, also took a toll on Israel’s economy. Since the suppression of the second intifada and the withdrawal from Gaza, the terrorist group has turned to rockets and mortars, then to tunnels, and now to setting fires in Israel by means of incendiary kites, balloons, and condoms. Hillel Frisch comments:

For all the feelings of terror engendered by the launching of over 14,000 missiles between 2004 and 2014 (a phenomenon that largely came to an end after the third bout between Hamas and Israel in the summer of 2014), missile terrorism was not nearly so [financially] costly to Israel as suicide bombing had been. . . . Missile terrorism was far less costly in human terms as well. Even if we take into account all the casualties of the three rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas, mortalities add up to approximately 120—that is to say, less than one-third the number of Israelis who were killed during the wave of suicide bombings. Note also that the wave of missile terrorism took place over ten years, while the suicide-bombing wave lasted four.

Whereas the effectiveness of suicide terrorism was vastly reduced as a result of the military punishment meted out by the IDF and the Shin Bet, missile terrorism became less effective over time due to technological developments that denied Hamas much of the potency of this means of attack. [Likewise], Hamas concluded that tunnel attacks, initially considered a supplement to its arsenal, should become a substitute for missile strikes.

[But] just as missile terrorism was far less effective than suicide bombing, so too was tunnel terrorism less effective than both—before it was essentially foiled by technological developments. . . .

It is against the backdrop of its never-ending quest to find substitutes for no-longer-effective terrorist measures that Hamas’s innovation of kite terrorism can be understood. Though it is too early to say conclusively that this means is the poorest of all those that preceded it, it would seem [likely] that a solution will be found before it becomes lethal rather than simply destructive, as it is at present. Of course, a technological solution would be best, but, in its absence, some innovative combat moves against the perpetrators would be welcome.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.