In the 1990s—following the Oslo Accords—Hamas launched lethally effective suicide bombings to murder Israelis; the attacks, which reached their bloody zenith during the second intifada, also took a toll on Israel’s economy. Since the suppression of the second intifada and the withdrawal from Gaza, the terrorist group has turned to rockets and mortars, then to tunnels, and now to setting fires in Israel by means of incendiary kites, balloons, and condoms. Hillel Frisch comments:

For all the feelings of terror engendered by the launching of over 14,000 missiles between 2004 and 2014 (a phenomenon that largely came to an end after the third bout between Hamas and Israel in the summer of 2014), missile terrorism was not nearly so [financially] costly to Israel as suicide bombing had been. . . . Missile terrorism was far less costly in human terms as well. Even if we take into account all the casualties of the three rounds of fighting between Israel and Hamas, mortalities add up to approximately 120—that is to say, less than one-third the number of Israelis who were killed during the wave of suicide bombings. Note also that the wave of missile terrorism took place over ten years, while the suicide-bombing wave lasted four.

Whereas the effectiveness of suicide terrorism was vastly reduced as a result of the military punishment meted out by the IDF and the Shin Bet, missile terrorism became less effective over time due to technological developments that denied Hamas much of the potency of this means of attack. [Likewise], Hamas concluded that tunnel attacks, initially considered a supplement to its arsenal, should become a substitute for missile strikes.

[But] just as missile terrorism was far less effective than suicide bombing, so too was tunnel terrorism less effective than both—before it was essentially foiled by technological developments. . . .

It is against the backdrop of its never-ending quest to find substitutes for no-longer-effective terrorist measures that Hamas’s innovation of kite terrorism can be understood. Though it is too early to say conclusively that this means is the poorest of all those that preceded it, it would seem [likely] that a solution will be found before it becomes lethal rather than simply destructive, as it is at present. Of course, a technological solution would be best, but, in its absence, some innovative combat moves against the perpetrators would be welcome.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.