As Bashar al-Assad and his allies have regained control of much of Syria, and now seem ready to crush the rebel strongholds in the country’s southwest and northwest, it is increasingly likely that victory is in reach for the Moscow-Tehran-Damascus axis. Yet, argues Frederic Hof, that outcome is by no means guaranteed. He urges American policymakers to push back before it’s too late:

[A]ny discussion of objectives and strategy must start with a clear understanding of why [the fate of Syria] matters to the United States. Pro-[Assad] elements in Washington and elsewhere try to make hay on this point. Their message to Donald Trump is (a) Assad has won, so don’t waste time, effort, and resources on Syria, (b) Assad’s supposed victory poses no challenge to American security, and (c) Assad might actually prove to be an asset in the battle against Islamist extremism of the Sunni variety.

The message here is that Syria matters profoundly to the interests of the United States and its allies in the region and beyond. Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu and Jordan’s King Abdullah will find, in the fullness of time, that their own reliance on Moscow to neutralize Tehran in Syria was misplaced. . . . But even if Washington cared nothing about Israeli and Jordanian security, the persistence of an Assad regime subordinated to Iran and to Lebanon’s Hizballah should be profoundly troubling, given the destabilizing agenda of Iran-based Shiite Islamist extremism. Even if Russian attempts to blackmail the West into subsidizing a crime family succeed, a Syria ruled by the corruptly brutal Assads will hemorrhage human beings and host extremist Islamists (Shiite and Sunni) for as far as the eye can see.

Many of the consequences of a continued Iran-Assad domination in Syria will fall on American allies and friends. But North America may not be exempt from violent reactions inspired by the Nazi-like practices of a systematically repressive regime. . . And Iran (often through Hizballah) has long-since demonstrated its terror reach into this hemisphere. . . .

Declining to accept the inevitability of perpetual Assad rule in Syria need not be a costly endeavor for American taxpayers. But neither will it be cost-free. With allies and partners organized to do heavy lifting, American leadership can permit Syrians to create an attractive, credible alternative to Assad in a prosperous northeast rich in petroleum and agriculture. By warning the Russians and working with Turkey, Assad can be deterred from mass homicide in Syria’s northwest. If resisting Iranian expansionism and extremist-abetting mass murder is more than just a rhetorical relic of bygone administrations, the United States will work to defeat the conclusion that Syria has been lost to Iran.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.