Has Intra-Islamic Violence in the Middle East Finally Peaked?

Much of the bloodshed that has wracked the Middle East in the past decade has been motivated by intra-Islamic religious differences—most often pitting Shiites against Sunnis, but also Sunnis against Alawites (the ruling religious minority in Syria) and Islamic State against everyone who has not accepted its own particular brand of Sunnism. To Hassan Hassan, this violence has marked the culmination of four decades of sectarian conflict in the Muslim world that began with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in the late 1970 and the subsequent rise of the Salafist-jihadist ideology that motivates al-Qaeda and Islamic State. He now believes this period is coming to an end:

In May, Iraq held its first nonsectarian election since 2003. In contrast to previous elections, public sectarian discourse was noticeably absent. Most of the political blocs campaigned with cross-sectarian slogans. . . . Before the election, it also became common to hear politicians and commentators emphasizing the need to rise above sectarianism and vengefulness in order to stabilize the country. . . .

The rapprochement between Shiite leaders like Moqtada al-Sadr and Iraq’s Sunni neighbors is reinforcing this trend. The cleric—once notorious for his hardline views, his prominent role in Iraq’s post-2003 bloody civil wars, and his [followers’] attacks against American soldiers—visited Riyadh last year. The Saudi foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, also visited Baghdad six months earlier. Within Iraq, Sadr is now known for his comparatively moderate political and religious views that emphasize the inclusion and better treatment of Sunnis in Iraq. . . .

Recent changes in Saudi Arabia’s posturing, [meanwhile], might help to close off a major source of the new brand of sectarianism [as well]. Since the rise of the new crown prince, Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia has taken a different direction. Bin Salman has specifically referred to 1979, [the year the kingdom began exporting its own intolerant brand of Islam and encouraging anti-Shiite sentiment], as a year that changed the kingdom and said that he wanted to shift away from the policies that followed. His rhetoric, as many now recognize, is just that—rhetoric. But some aspects of his policies will have a real, positive impact. . . .

The political situation in the region is still volatile, and there will continue to be a degree of destructive sectarianism. . . . But sectarianism, for now, is at its lowest levels in the 40 years since . . . 1979, and will likely remain low for the foreseeable future. The changes in Saudi Arabia haven’t promoted moderation; they have merely stopped the pumping of sectarian hatred into the region. So now, moderate institutions and individuals have their best chance in decades to shape the future of the Middle East.

Read more at Atlantic

More about: Iran, Middle East, Politics & Current Affairs, Saudi Arabia, Shiites, Sunnis

For the Sake of Gaza, Defeat Hamas Soon

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.

Read more at Commentary

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Joseph Biden