Today, a painting by Salvador Dalí depicting figures at prayer at the Western Wall is being auctioned to raise money for a charitable foundation. While the surrealist painter had been accused of harboring Nazi sympathies in the 1930s and 40s, he would later create a series of artworks on Jewish themes, including his bronze Peace Menorah which stands at Ben-Gurion airport. Menachem Wecker comments on the work:

I’ve written extensively on Jewish art for nearly twenty years, but this religious picture of Dalí’s is new to me. I am familiar with other religious works, particularly Dalí’s mysterious The Sacrament of the Last Supper (1955) at the National Gallery of Art.

“O you, people of Israel, chosen people, sons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. For your devotion to upholding traditions, for the joy with which you celebrate and sanctify your festivities, I created this ‘Peace Menorah’ and this painting of the ‘Western Wall,’” Dalí said, in an inscription on [the] bronze Menorah. . . . “While with your unshakeable faith you pray for the glory of your ancestors and for the triumph of truth, I want you to see in the radiation of these bright and cheerful lights, a tribute to your people.”

In difficult-to-decipher handwriting, Dalí painted Barukh Hashem, “Blessed is God’s name,” in Hebrew script on the Western Wall, and this is Dalí’s lone work depicting a sacred site.

The auction house doesn’t mention it, but Dalí’s vision here aligns—in likely unintended ways—with some Zionist representations of the Western Wall, or Kotel, which deliberately edit out the Dome of the Rock.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.