The Long, Troubled History of Jews and the Left

March 12 2015

To some, the political left appears to be a natural home for Jews; for others, it appears a source of endless betrayal, anti-Semitism, and hostility toward Israel. A recent book by Philip Mendes attempts to make sense of the history. David Hirsh writes in his review:

[W]hile a significant minority of Jews were influential within the radical left, a substantial majority of Jews remained outside of it. . . . A contemporary imbalance follows: while a large and influential proportion of left anti-Zionists are Jewish, only a very small percentage of Jews are anti-Zionists.

On the other hand, argues Mendes, the left, broadly conceived, did have a number of contact points with the wider Jewish communities. The left’s universalist tradition of equality coincided with the interest in emancipation of the Jews; many Jews in Europe and Russia were poor and the left championed the poor; there was a Jewish tradition of literacy and intellectualism which fed easily into the left and that attracted some Jews; Jews moved toward the towns and cities early and the left was a significantly urban movement; Jews often had an ambiguous place in relation to the identities of the emerging nationalisms among which they lived, as did the left, so notions of cosmopolitanism had the potential to become a shared value, as well as a source of particular hostility from the outside. . . .

When movements came to power in Russia and Eastern Europe which described themselves as socialist, they were also pioneers of state-imposed anti-Semitism; the experience of Nazism did little to inoculate Communist states against anti-Semitism, it only drove them to articulate it in slightly different formulations.

Read more at Fathom

More about: Anti-Semitism, Doctors' Plot, History & Ideas, Jewish history, Leftism, Socialism

The Deal with Hamas Involves Painful, but Perhaps Necessary Concessions

Jan. 17 2025

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.

Read more at Free Press

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli Security