Born in Hamburg in 1843, Ahron Marcus received substantive Jewish and secular educations, then—following an apparent adolescent religious crisis—left Germany for Galicia, studied in a ḥasidic yeshiva, married a ḥasidic woman, and found himself a ḥasidic rebbe. He went on to author works of biblical and talmudic scholarship, in addition to books and articles (some in Hebrew, some in German) on Josephus, the relevance of recent archaeological discoveries in Egypt and Mesopotamia to the Bible and Talmud, and the application of contemporary psychological theories to Ḥasidism, as well as the first-ever scholarly history of the movement. In the 1880s, he became a leading figure in the pre-Herzlian Zionist movement Ḥibbat Tsiyon, as Shlomo Zuckier writes:

Marcus’s Zionism reached its peak . . . upon his reading Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat in 1896, on which he lectured in the following year. Breaking with Maḥzikey ha-Dat, [Galicia’s dominant] Orthodox communal organization, Marcus spent the next four years in lengthy correspondence and personal friendship with Herzl, discussing theoretical matters but, most importantly, the possibility of bringing East European traditionalists into alliance with the Zionist movement. . . . Marcus spent significant energies endeavoring to forge an alliance between . . . David Moshe Friedmann, the Czortkower rebbe, and Herzl’s Zionist movement, toiling in vain to set up a personal meeting between the two.

Ideologically, he combined a certain messianic view idealizing the potential restoration of the Jewish homeland with a down-to-earth position focused on uniting European Jewry around pragmatic alliances. Zionist nationalism should be uncontroversial, Marcus argued, because nationalistic loyalty is simply based on the extension of familial ties, and the ties of the Jewish family are strong. . . .

Unfortunately, the ḥasidic-Zionist alliance was not meant to be. The meeting between Herzl and Rabbi Friedmann never took place. By 1900, several ḥasidic leaders explicitly opposed Herzl and his project, Marcus despaired of his great plan, and in 1912 was among the founders of [the ultra-Orthodox party] Agudat Yisrael.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.