The 11th and 12th centuries constituted a golden age of Jewish biblical scholarship in Europe with Rashi, his grandson Shmuel ben Meir (Rashbam), Abraham ibn Ezra, and others writing glosses that are still studied today. In her new book In Hebreo: The Victorine Exegesis of the Bible in the Light of its Northern French Jewish Sources, Montse Leyra-Curia explores how these works likely shaped Christian clergy’s understanding of the Hebrew Bible. Martin Lockshin writes in his review:

The Christian world also produced crucial and innovative Bible commentaries in the very same years and in the very same country: France. Rashi and Rashbam were born and lived in France; ibn Ezra moved there later in life and produced many Bible commentaries there. [Around the same time], Christians affiliated with the Abbey of St. Victor, a kind of monastery-university on the outskirts of Paris, produced pathbreaking Bible commentaries. The most famous of these Christians were Hugh of St. Victor and Andrew of St. Victor. For almost a century, modern scholars have noticed the similarities between the commentaries of Rashi, Rashbam, and ibn Ezra, on the one hand, and the Latin Bible commentaries of the Victorines, [as these clergymen are known], on the other. . . .

Although Hugh and Andrew never mention any living Jewish writer by name, in their Bible commentaries they frequently refer to what the “Iudei” (Jews) or the “Hebrei” (Hebrews) say about a biblical verse. Sometimes they record the common Christian interpretation and then correct it, saying that the text “in hebreo” (in Hebrew) really means something else.

Leyra-Curia . . . does not believe their Hebrew was good enough either for them to have had their own independent understanding of the biblical Hebrew text or for them to have read and understood the Bible commentaries of Rashi, Rashbam, and others. [Furthermore], most of their references are to Jewish interpretations that first appeared in the 11th and 12th centuries. . . .  Leyra-Curia reasonably concludes that Christians like Hugh and Andrew talked about the meaning of biblical verses with living Jews in northern France.

Which Jews? Leyra-Curia . . . finds that Hugh and Andrew cite or agree with interpretations found in Rashbam’s Torah commentary more often than with those found in any other Jewish Bible commentary. She concludes: “There is a high probability that Rashbam himself taught . . .  interpretations to Hugh or to both Victorines.” From his own writings, she adds, we know that Rashbam spent time in Paris. He also occasionally refers to conversations he had with Christians who, he claims, “admitted” that what he said made sense. . . . [I]n 400 pages of meticulous scholarship, she builds a strong case that Rashbam “talked Torah” with Christian clergy.  Presumably he was not the only Jew to do so.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.