When the Jewish false messiah Shabbetai Tsvi converted to Islam in 1666—under threat of execution by the Ottoman sultan—most of those who had believed his claims became disillusioned; others remained committed in secret. But his most devoted followers joined him in becoming Muslim, a move they justified through Shabtai’s kabbalistic teachings. Their descendants, known as the Dönme, practice their own idiosyncratic form of Judaism in secret and remain a separate community in modern Turkey, where they are the subject of outlandish, and anti-Semitic, conspiracy theories. Türkay Salim Nefes writes:

Since the early 20th century, conspiracy theories have accused the Dönme of secretly manipulating Turkish society and politics.

The conspiratorial rhetoric initially emerged after Theodor Herzl [first tried to arrange a meeting with the sultan in 1896]. The Ottoman ruler, Abdulhamid II, did not grant the request, and in 1908, he was toppled by a coup d’état. Some conspiratorial accounts claimed that the coup was Jewish revenge for his refusal to “sell” Palestine [to Herzl]. . . .

[After 1945, the Turkish government’s] censorship of political groups decreased. This enabled right-wing and Islamist groups to circulate conspiracy theories about the community. . . . Until the 1990s, the conspiratorial accounts were confined to marginal right-wing circles, Turkish nationalists, and Islamists. During the 1990s and 2000s, the conspiratorial accounts became prevalent once again after [publication of] the works of a self-proclaimed Dönme, Ilgaz Zorlu. He wrote articles about the history of the group and advocated that Dönmes should convert back to Judaism. . . . In this period, not only right-wingers and Islamists but also some left-wingers . . . published conspiratorial accounts about the community.

Below, today’s newsletter will return to some other reflections on the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of the current war, but first something must be said of its recent progress. Israel has kept up its aerial and ground assault on Hizballah, and may have already killed the successor to Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader it eliminated less than two weeks ago. Matthew Levitt assesses the current state of the Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, in his view, is now “a shadow of its former self.” Indeed, he adds,

it is no exaggeration to say that the Hizballah of two weeks ago no longer exists. And since Hizballah was the backbone of Iran’s network of militant proxies, its so-called axis of resistance, Iran’s strategy of arming and deploying proxy groups throughout the region is suddenly at risk as well.

Hizballah’s attacks put increasing pressure on Israel, as intended, only that pressure did not lead Israelis to stop targeting Hamas so much as it chipped away at Israel’s fears about the cost of military action to address the military threats posed by Hizballah.

At the same time, Levitt explains, Hizballah still poses a serious threat, as it demonstrated last night when its missiles struck Haifa and Tiberias, injuring at least two people:

Hizballah still maintains an arsenal of rockets and a cadre of several thousand fighters. It will continue to pose potent military threats for Israel, Lebanon, and the wider region.

How will the group seek to avenge Nasrallah’s death amid these military setbacks? Hizballah is likely to resort to acts of international terrorism, which are overseen by one of the few elements of the group that has not yet lost key leaders.

But the true measure of whether the group will be able to reconstitute itself, even over many years, is whether Iran can restock Hizballah’s sophisticated arsenal. Tehran’s network of proxy groups—from Hizballah to Hamas to the Houthis—is only as dangerous as it is today because of Iran’s provision of weapons and money. Whatever Hizballah does next, Western governments must prioritize cutting off Tehran’s ability to arm and fund its proxies.