Mentioned in the book of Joshua, the ancient city of Dor was located near a natural harbor about twenty miles south of modern-day Haifa. In the mid-5th century BCE, the Athenian navy took it over as a convenient Mediterranean base of operations. Archaeologists are now engaged in exploring a fortress built by the Seleucids—the Hellenistic dynasty that ruled the area after the death of Alexander the Great—which is now entirely submerged in water. Edward Whelan writes:

Once [the fortress] was two stories high and . . . measured 60 by 120 feet. Some stones have wooden post holes that may have been used for wooden platforms upon which catapults were placed. We know much about the turbulent history of Tel Dor from the books of Maccabees. It appears that the fortress was built by Diodotus Tryphon, who acted as regent for a young Seleucid king before declaring himself ruler in 142 BCE, around the time the Greeks and the Jewish Hasmonean kingdom were battling for control of what is now Israel.

[Diodotus] was one of the three rulers who vied for control of the area in a series of bloody wars, the others being Demetrius Nicator [who also claimed the Seleucid throne] and Jonathan Apphus, ruler of Judea. Details of these battles are found in the book of Maccabees and portray Diodotus Tryphon as a cruel and treacherous ruler. . . .

Some missiles believed to be slingshots and arrowheads have been found that date back to Demetrius’ siege of Dor and some bear the marking “victory over Tryphon.” . . .

Tel Dor was [later] occupied by the Romans, but the fortress did not stand long because of storms and rising sea levels. By the 1st century CE, much of the fortress was underneath the waves of the bay.

Recent satellite imagery has shown a buildup of Egyptian tanks near the Israeli border, in violation of Egypt-Israel agreements going back to the 1970s. It’s possible Cairo wants to prevent Palestinians from entering the Sinai from Gaza, or perhaps it wants to send a message to the U.S. that it will take all measures necessary to keep that from happening. But there is also a chance, however small, that it could be preparing for something more dangerous. David Wurmser examines President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi’s predicament:

Egypt’s abysmal behavior in allowing its common border with Gaza to be used for the dangerous smuggling of weapons, money, and materiel to Hamas built the problem that exploded on October 7. Hamas could arm only to the level that Egypt enabled it. Once exposed, rather than help Israel fix the problem it enabled, Egypt manufactured tensions with Israel to divert attention from its own culpability.

Now that the Trump administration is threatening to remove the population of Gaza, President Sisi is reaping the consequences of a problem he and his predecessors helped to sow. That, writes Wurmser, leaves him with a dilemma:

On one hand, Egypt fears for its regime’s survival if it accepts Trump’s plan. It would position Cairo as a participant in a second disaster, or nakba. It knows from its own history; King Farouk was overthrown in 1952 in part for his failure to prevent the first nakba in 1948. Any leader who fails to stop a second nakba, let alone participates in it, risks losing legitimacy and being seen as weak. The perception of buckling on the Palestine issue also resulted in the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. President Sisi risks being seen by his own population as too weak to stand up to Israel or the United States, as not upholding his manliness.

In a worst-case scenario, Wurmser argues, Sisi might decide that he’d rather fight a disastrous war with Israel and blow up his relationship with Washington than display that kind of weakness.