How Does One Spot a Biblical Fake?

From time to time, I come across a story about some exciting archaeological discovery that, a few weeks later, proves to be inauthentic, if not a straightforward forgery. Other times, forged artifacts are taken to be genuine for years before some scholar comes along to argue that they are not. This is what has recently happened with a relief statue of a female figure, bearing a Greek inscription, currently on display at the Harvard Museum of the Ancient Near East. Jonathan Klawans explains the clues that led him to conclude it is in authentic, but he begins with the story of its discovery:

The piece in question is part of the Merrill Collection, named for the colorful and controversial archaeologist, explorer, and diplomat Selah Merrill (1837–1909). Having served as a chaplain during the U.S. Civil War, Merrill also spent three years in the employ of the American Palestine Exploration Society (1874–77) and went on to serve three nonconsecutive terms as the U.S. consul in Jerusalem between 1882 and 1907.

The inclusion of the object in Merrill’s collection of “biblical antiquities” is one sure sign that the object was considered to be biblical in some sense. Confirmation of the piece’s early reception as “biblical” comes from the single publication I know of devoted to the object, a three-page essay by Theodore F. Wright written in 1901. Wright’s essay objects to a prior identification of the piece as ancient Christian, intimating that the piece was so labeled when originally displayed.

Wright preferred a different understanding, one no less biblical (in the broad sense), and his interpretation is the one adopted by the object’s current caption: “the Queen of Heaven,” in the form of the goddess Astarte, worshiped throughout the region. Wright also pointed to the biblical place name “Ashtarot” (Deuteronomy 1:4; Joshua 9:10).

Read more at Bible History Daily

More about: Ancient Near East, Archaeology

 

Why Egypt Fears an Israeli Victory in Gaza

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.

Read more at Washington Examiner

More about: Egypt, Gaza War 2023, U.S. Foreign policy