In the book of Samuel, the Philistines capture the Ark of the Covenant from the sinful Israelites and place it in the temple of their god Dagon. The next day, the priests find that the idol of Dagon has fallen to the ground and set it upright. The day after that, they find the statue lying on the ground and broken into pieces, and decide to find another place for the Ark.

This episode is one of very few sources about the religion of the Philistines, who controlled southwestern Canaan and battled with the ancient Israelites for many centuries. Recent research, based on years of excavations of the city of Gath—home to Goliath, the most famous Philistine—provides some new information on the subject, as Judy Siegel-Itzkovich writes:

The discovery of numerous plants in two temples unearthed at the site unraveled unprecedented insights into Philistine cultic rituals and beliefs—the food ingredients in their temple, the timing of ceremonies, and plants for temple decoration. Freshwater, agriculture, and the cyclical birth, death, and rebirth of a plant are recognized and venerated as transformative, and even magical, in the oldest myths, such as the Gilgamesh epic, the tale of Aqhat, and the worship of deities such as Tammuz, Ishtar, and Baal.

An analysis of the temples’ seeds and fruits provided valuable insights into the timing of rituals, with the importance of the early spring for temple rites, and the date of the final utilization of the temples—and their destruction by Hazael of Aram, [described in 2Kings 12:17]—which occurred in late summer or early fall. The seasonal aspect of Philistine religious practices underscores their deep connection to the natural world and the cycles of agriculture.

Between the explosion of thousands of Hizballah pagers on September 17 and now, Iran’s geopolitical clout has shrunk dramatically: Hizballah, Iran’s most important striking force, has retreated to lick its wounds; Iranian influence in Syria has collapsed; Iran’s attempts to attack Israel via Gaza have proved self-defeating; its missile and drone arsenal have proved impotent; and its territorial defenses have proved useless in the face of Israeli airpower. Edward Luttwak considers what might happen next:

The myth of Iranian power was ironically propagated by the United States itself. Right at the start of his first term, in January 2009, Barack Obama was terrified that he would be maneuvered into fighting a war against Iran. . . . Obama started his tenure by apologizing for America’s erstwhile support for the shah. And beyond showing contrition for the past, the then-president also set a new rule, one that lasted all the way to October 2024: Iran may attack anyone, but none may attack Iran.

[Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s] variegated fighters, in light trucks and jeeps, could have been stopped by a few hundred well-trained soldiers. But neither Hizballah nor Iran’s own Revolutionary Guards could react. Hizballah no longer has any large units capable of crossing the border to fight rebels in Syria, as they had done so many times before. As for the Revolutionary Guards, they were commandeering civilian airliners to fly troops into Damascus airport to support Assad. But then Israel made clear that it would not allow Iran’s troops so close to its border, and Iran no longer had credible counter-threats.

Now Iran’s population is discovering that it has spent decades in poverty to pay for the massive build-up of the Revolutionary Guards and all their militias. And for what? They have elaborate bases and showy headquarters, but their expensive ballistic missiles can only be used against defenseless Arabs, not Israel with its Arrow interceptors. As for Hizballah, clearly it cannot even defend itself, let alone Iran’s remaining allies in the region. Perhaps, in short, the dictatorship will finally be challenged in the streets of Iran’s cities, at scale and in earnest.