Following the destruction brought by the First Crusade in 1096, two separate intellectual trends emerged among the Jews of northern Europe that would have a tremendous impact on generations to come: in France, rabbis began composing extended, in-depth commentaries on the Talmud known as Tosafot (additions); in Germany, a group of scholars focused their attention on prayer, mysticism, and ascetic practices. Members of the latter group came to be known as Hasidei Ashkenaz (the pious ones of German) or simply hasidim, although they should not be confused with today’s Hasidim, who originated in 18th-century Eastern Europe. Tamar Marvin examines their origins and beliefs:

It has long been debated by scholars what relationship the rise of the Hasidei Ashkenaz bears to the Crusade violence and to contemporary Christian pietistic movements, which it resembles in some aspects. It has been suggested that the movement was a response to the extreme violence of 1096, though some scholars stress continuities to pre-Crusade Ashkenazi Jewish mores and practices. More difficult to prove are contacts between German Christian monastics and the leaders of the Ashkenazi Jewish community, and [evidence of] these contacts remains compelling but circumstantial.

One of the notable factors pointing towards the Hasidei Ashkenaz as a response to the violence of the First, Second, and Third Crusade periods is their fixation on kiddush ha-Shem (martyrdom) and extreme practices of self-mortification.

More central, however, is the Hasidei Ashkenaz’s focus on God’s unity and incorporeality, coupled with a development of Divine intermediaries influenced by Saadya Gaon’s notion of kavod, an emanation of Divine Glory. This interest in intermediaries also led Hasidei Ashkenaz to develop a complex system of demonology and attendant magical rites to counter it. However, they maintained the immanence (presence in the world) of God Himself.

If there is to be peace, Palestinians will have to unlearn the hatred of Israel they have imbibed during nearly two decades of Hamas rule. This will be a difficult task, but Cole Aronson argues, drawing on the experiences of World War II, that Israel has already gotten off to a strong start:

The population’s compliance can . . . be won by a new regime that satisfies its immediate material needs, even if that new regime is sponsored by a government until recently at war with the population’s former regime. Axis civilians were made needy through bombing. Peaceful compliance with the Allies became a good alternative to supporting violent resistance to the Allies.

Israel’s current campaign makes a moderate Gaza more likely, not less. Destroying Hamas not only deprives Islamists of the ability to rule—it proves the futility of armed resistance to Israel, a condition for peace. The destruction of buildings not only deprives Hamas of its hideouts. It also gives ordinary Palestinians strong reasons to shun groups planning to replicate Hamas’s behavior.