In this conversation, the geneticist and writer Razib Khan talks to the pundit Jonah Goldberg about the advances in genetics over the past two decades, the interactions between Homo sapiens and other similar species, and how natural selection is shaping humans today. Of particular interest is the middle segment, where the two discuss what genetic research can tell us about Jews, and about the origins of Ashkenazi Jews in particular. (Khan also wrote about the subject here, but a subscription is required to read the entire post.)

Khan’s conclusions, it’s worth noting, align quite closely with what is known from liturgical traditions, the writings of early Ashkenazim, and other elements of the historical record. For instance: the fact that Ashkenazi genomes tend to show Middle Eastern and southern European (likely Italian) ancestry comports with Jews from the Land of Israel and elsewhere in the Middle East arriving in Italy and from there migrating to France and western Germany. The evidence also suggests that most of the European genetic influx occurred during late antiquity and the early Middle Ages, when there were fewer barriers to conversion to Judaism. (Audio, 75 minutes. The discussion of Jews begins around the 35:51 mark.)

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.