Despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Western diplomats persist in believing that bringing peace between Israelis and Palestinians is easy. If anything, notes Clifford May, their misguided efforts are apt to make things worse:

Over the weekend, French foreign minister Laurent Fabius visited ‎Jerusalem and Ramallah, . . . where he discussed a resolution he is ‎eager to advance in the UN Security Council. It would call for the immediate renewal of talks ‎between Israelis and Palestinians and set a time frame of about eighteen months for them to reach a ‎permanent agreement based on the 1967 lines and with Jerusalem as a shared capital. ‎

If, by the deadline, no agreement is reached, Western governments would recognize a Palestinian ‎state. Is it possible Fabius does not realize that would give Abbas a strong incentive not ‎to compromise?‎

Even if, through some miracle, the eighty-year-old PA president did come to terms with Israel, what ‎would be the result? He was elected to a four-year term ten years ago. Hamas doesn’t recognize ‎his authority. It’s likely that his successor—whoever that may be and however he may come to ‎power—won’t, either. ‎

Knowing this, should Israelis really be expected to make concessions that will endanger the lives ‎of their children? In the past, American presidents, Republican and Democratic alike, have ‎blocked such actions in the Security Council. But President Barack Obama is threatening to break ‎with that tradition. There is speculation that he’s actually encouraging the French to take this ‎step.‎

The glib reply: “Something needs to be done!” But perceived urgency is not the same as smart ‎policy. How about this: concentrate on incremental improvements.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.