In response to reports that Hamas is negotiating independently with Israel for a long-term cease-fire, Mahmoud Abbas has announced the resignation of the Palestinian Authority’s “unity government.” While the collapse of the Fatah-Hamas coalition—largely fictive to begin with—is unlikely to have any practical effects, Jonathan Tobin detects lessons to be learned from it:

[T]hose advocating unilateral recognition for Palestinian statehood need to draw some conclusions from these events. There are already two rival Palestinian entities that pretend to sovereignty, but neither is truly representative or the least bit interested in ending the conflict [with Israel]. Indeed, the PA that is held out by the Obama administration as a champion of peace turns out to be even less enthusiastic about avoiding bloodshed than Hamas. If you are advocating a Palestinian state now without peace with Israel, the question remains which one do you want: a corrupt kleptocracy that is still incapable of making peace because of ideology and its fear of being outflanked by Islamists, or a corrupt Islamist terrorist tyranny? For the foreseeable future, those are your only choices.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.