In light of the collapse of Syria, which controlled the Golan Heights until 1967, Zvi Hauser argues that there is no longer any reason for Israel not to claim full sovereignty over the territory (free registration required):

The validity of the arrangements that defined the borders and the countries in the Middle East after World War I has expired, and the region can now expect many years of instability. In such a situation, Israel must reformulate its geostrategic interests. . . .

Israel can, and must, separate the international discussion about the Golan Heights from the discussion of Judea and Samaria. As opposed to the West Bank, on the Golan there is no [fundamental problem] of ruling another people; the 22,000 Druze who are fortunate enough to live on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights are entitled to full Israeli citizenship. Nor is there a “demographic problem” there: the region has a Jewish majority, with some 25,000 Jewish residents. Above all, there is no alternative to Israeli rule on the Golan, even in the long term.

There should now be a process of “coordinating expectations” with the international community . . . in an overall context of stabilizing the region. Neither Islamic State, nor the jihadists of Nusra Front and al-Qaeda, nor a crude foothold of [the] Iran-Hizballah-Assad [axis] . . . will enable the stabilization and rehabilitation of the region. There is no horizon on the Golan Heights other than the Israeli one.

The imminent nuclear agreement with Iran—which is a bad deal—also creates a concrete opportunity to discuss the issue. It is doubtful whether Israel can influence the signing of the agreement, but it can exert real influence in the “discussion on compensation.” . . . The balancing formula in light of the Iranian achievement (and Assad’s murderous behavior) must include a maximum reduction in the danger of Iranian nuclearization, along with containment of Iran’s potential for conventional aggression. This can be done by creating an international agreement to . . . shelve the Shiite-Alawite aspiration to regain control of the Israeli Golan, which constitutes less than 1 percent of the area of what used to be Syria.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.