Since 1981, the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO), which includes U.S. troops, has been deployed in the Sinai peninsula to enforce the Israel-Egypt peace treaty. Following the eruption of jihadist violence in the Sinai earlier this year, the Pentagon has been reassessing the need for these troops. Eric Trager argues that even a partial withdrawal would be a grave mistake:

[T]he Obama administration’s deliberations are driven by . . . quite valid concerns about ensuring the security of MFO personnel. The jihadists’ increased sophistication, coupled with the Egyptian military’s outdated strategy, significantly endangers a peacekeeping operation that was previously considered very low-risk. Despite these concerns, however, the administration should keep in mind the dangers of changing the MFO’s deployment anytime soon.

First, any decrease in the MFO’s strength risks weakening a multinational institution that has not only verified the [Egypt-Israel] treaty’s enforcement, but also encouraged the unprecedented Egyptian-Israeli strategic coordination that exists today. This coordination is not inevitable: bilateral relations nearly collapsed in September 2011, when an Egyptian mob attacked the Israeli embassy in Giza three weeks after Israeli forces accidentally killed six Egyptian soldiers while chasing jihadists back across the border. . . . Throughout this uncertain period, the MFO facilitated bilateral cooperation and, in the face of a burgeoning Sinai insurgency, even secured Israel’s permission for Egyptian troop deployments that exceeded the treaty’s limitations. If anything, today’s robust strategic coordination is an argument for the MFO’s importance, not its superfluity.

Second, given that the MFO is among the few U.S. policy successes in the Middle East, any plans to draw it down would further trouble those allies who are concerned about America’s perceived departure from the region, and undermine the Obama administration’s efforts to reassure these allies following the Iran deal.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”