No, the “Status Quo” on the Temple Mount Hasn’t Changed. But It Should

Palestinian leaders have assiduously spread rumors that Israel is planning to change current regulations that allow Muslims but not Jews to pray on the Temple Mount. Without any basis in reality, the rumors have served as a pretext for the ongoing wave of terror. Actually, Hillel Frisch writes, there are compelling reasons why Israel should change its policies:

[T]he status quo on the Temple Mount . . . must change on both strategic and moral grounds. Strategically, the status quo must change because the demand that Jews (and Christians as well) be given the right to pray on the Temple Mount interlocks with Israel’s justifiable demand that the Palestinians accept Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.

Most Palestinians oppose both Jewish prayer on the Temple Mount and recognition of Israel as a Jewish state for the same . . . reason. In their view, Jews can be no more than . . . a protected but subordinate religious minority under [Muslim rule], and not a sovereign people. . . .

Only if the Palestinians accept the right of parity and religious freedom on the Mount in Jerusalem, and recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people will the war of independence that Israel fought in 1948 be truly over. . . .

There is another reason why the status quo on the Temple Mount should change. It starts with the realization that Israel is facing a situation of protracted conflict with the Palestinians; a conflict that will have to be managed for the long term. In this situation, it is critically important that the Palestinians realize that Israel’s managing of the conflict does not necessarily mean keeping the status quo. After all, if the Palestinians have nothing to lose from a protracted conflict, why should they move to moderate their positions?

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Israel & Zionism, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Palestinian terror, Temple Mount

Why Egypt Fears an Israeli Victory in Gaza

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.

Read more at Washington Examiner

More about: Egypt, Gaza War 2023, U.S. Foreign policy