Since the Syrian civil war began, Israel has carried out airstrikes to prevent Hizballah from establishing positions close to its borders or receiving shipments of weapons. So far, Israel has not been hindered by the Russian air campaign in Syria, and Russian planes have occasionally entered Israeli airspace without incident. But as Russian cooperation with Hizballah increases, writes Nadav Pollak, a confrontation becomes more likely:

[T]wo main trends will challenge Israeli-Russian coordination. The first is Iran and Hizballah’s objective of expanding their presence in the Golan Heights. In mid-October, Hizballah and Syrian forces pushed back rebels in Quneitra and regained control over a number of important military posts. Since then, the Assad regime and its partners have intensified their operations in the south [of Syria]. . . . [A]ny expansion of Hizballah and Iranian proxies in Quneitra or western Deraa province, [which lies just east of the Golan], would be considered a threat to Israel. And if Russia facilitates such advancement with its airpower, Jerusalem’s ability to react will be more limited.

Another trend . . . is Russia’s deepening relations with Hizballah and Iran. The intervention’s unremarkable results thus far have shown Moscow that the air campaign has its limits without a capable ground force. In that regard, Hizballah and Iranian forces have proven to be instrumental on some fronts. . . . [A]s the fighting continues, Moscow might discover that its relations with Hizballah and Iran outweigh its silent agreement to allow Israeli airstrikes against them. In that scenario, Israeli pilots would quite suddenly find themselves under threat from sophisticated Russian air defenses.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.